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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KING BROS., INC., a corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant

vs.
UTAH DRY KILN COMPANY, INC.,
a corporation,

Case No. 10931

Defendant-Respondent

....................................................
...................................................

BRIEF Of APPELLANT
...................................................
...................................................

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Appellant
as a supplier of building material to the Defendant-Respondent for the building of a lumber dry kiln at Panguitch, Utah, and is brought under Sections 14-2-1 and
14-2-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found the issues for the DefendantRespondent after a trial without a jury and rendered a
judgment for the defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the District Court Judgment and directing the lower court to
enter judgment for the appellant as prayed for in its
complaint.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
. This is the second time the Appellant has appealed
this same case to this Court, the first case being found
in 374 Pac.2d 254 and in which this court reversed the
lower court's order dismissing the action and the case
was sent back for trial. The question before the Court
on the first appeal was whether or not the plaintiff was
entitled to present evidence showing that the material
supplied had been attached to the realty so as to be an
improvement to land which fact had been questioned
by the Defendant-Respondent.
The amended complaint (R-8-11) is in two causes
of action and alleges that the plaintiff King Bros., Inc.
supplied to the building contractor, Oregon Dryer Company one burner with stack opening and one furnace
casing of a value of $2,692.00 for installation in the dry
kiln of the defendant at Panguitch, Utah and also that
the plaintiff's assignor, Mead and Associates supplied to
Oregon Dryer Company three aerovent Macheta Semipressure fans and steel panel orifice and three breather
pipes and hoods of a value of $1,463.19 for installation in
the defendant's dry kiln. Neither supplier of this equipment was paid by Oregon Dryer Company or the defendant, and the contractor, Oregon Dryer Company has
gone defunct and so the suppliers now seek a judgment
against the defendant-Respondent as the owner of the
dry kiln for the reason that the contract was in excess
of $500.00 and that the defendant had not required a
bond of the contractor as required by law.

ARGUMENT

POINT NO. 1
THE EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS INSTALLED IN THE BUILDING OF
THE DEFENDANT AND BECAME AN IMPROVEMENT TO THE LAND AND THE DEFENDANT IS
LIABLE UNDER SECTION 14-2-1 AND 2, UTAH
CODE ANN. 1953.

3
This is an action brought under the following statutes:
"14-2-1 Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen.
The owner of any interest in land entering·into a contract, involving $500 or more, for the construction,
addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building,
structure or improvement upon land shall, before any
such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor
a bond in a sum equal to the contract price, with good
and sufficient sureties, conditioned· for the faithful
performance of the contract and prompt payment for
material furnished and labor performed under the
contract. Such bond shall run to the owner and to all
other persons as their interest may appear; and any
person who has furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such building, structure or improvement, payment for which has not been made,
shall have a direct right of action against the sureties
upon such bond for the reasonable value of the materials. furnished or labor performed, not exceeding,
however, in any case the price agreed upon, which
right of action shall accrue forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or default in the performance of the work provided for in the contract.
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to
any person interested, upon request."
"14-2-2, Failure to require bond - Direct liability. Any
person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who
shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient bond, or
to exhibit the same, as herein required, shall be personally liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the
reasonable value of such materials furnished or labor
performed not exceeding, however, in any case the
Price agreed upon."
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In the first appeal of this same case the Respondent
claimed that the above statutes were not applicable because the dry kilning equipment sued for still retained
its identity as machinery or equipment and was in the
nature of personal property, not affixed to the realty so
as to become an improvement to land. The lower court
so ruled and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss.
This Court on appeal reversed the lower court and ruled
that as to whether the equipment sued for was affixed
to the realty so as to become an improvement was a
question upon which testimony must be taken and the
plaintiff was entitled to its "day in court."
At the trial of the case below, the evidence amply
substantiated the claim of the plaintiff-appellant that
the equipment sued for actually became affixed to the
land so as to be an improvement under the above sta·
tutes. From the language of the opinion in the first case,
King Bros., Inc., vs. Utah Dry Kiln Company, Inc. 374
Pac.2d 254 and the evidence submitted (R-21) and the
pictures of the installation (R-33-34) it is clear that the
equipment was affixed to and became an integral part
of the dry kiln and in fact the building would not be a
dry kiln without the equipment. In fact the defendant
has practically conceded that such was the case (R-45·
45) . This is so by reason of the holding and language in
the opinion in the first case and particularly by reason
of the case of Metals Manufacturing Co. vs. Bank of
Commerce, 395 Pac.2d 914 (Utah) decided after the
first King Bros. case was decided. It should be noted
that in this Bank of Commerce case there was only a
ten year lease on the building in question and the equip·
ment sued for had not been installed with as much per·
manency as the equipment in this case and there was
even an agreement between the lessee and the lessor
that the very equipment sued for would remain personal
property.
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Therefore, this appellant contends that under the
facts shown and the opinion in the first King Bros. case
and the Bank of Commerce case, the issue of whether
the equipment sued for was so affixed to the realty as
to become an improvement has been resolved in favor
of the appellant.
POINT NO. 2
THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT WAS THE OWNER OF AN INTEREST IN THE LAND UPON WHICH
THE KILN WAS BUILT AND THE STATUTES RELIED UPON ARE APPLICABLE.
At the trial of the case and the defendant-respondent's Memorandum of Authorities submitted below, the
claim is made that the defendant was not an owner of
an interest in the land upon which the dry kiln was built
and therefore, the statutes under which this action is
brought are not applicable. In fact this was the basis
for the lower court's decision. It is admitted by the plaintiff-appellant that the defendant does not hold a deed
for the land and does not hold legal title thereto. In
fact the record shows, (Transc.-112) that the land upon
which the kiln is built is actually owned by J. E. Croft
and Sons, a partnership and by Croft-Pearson Industries, now a corporation but also a partnership at the
time the building was built. However, this Court has
ruled a number of times that the person building the
improvements does not have to be the legal owner of
the land as such and that a leasehold is sufficient. In
the last pronouncement from this Court in interpreting the statutes relied upon, the Bank of Commerce
case, supra, the "owner" held only a lease.
As pointed out in the first case on appeal, the laws
pertaining to Mechanics' liens are practically the same
as the statutes under which this action is brought and
are very helpful in determining the application of the
statutes sued upon here. 36 Am. Jur. page 36 provides
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that a leasehold is sufficient ownership of land for the
filing of a mechanics' lien and likewise the old Utah
case of Ellis vs. Porter, 29 Pac. 879 and also the more
recent case of Buehner Block Co. vs. Glezos, 310 Pac.2d
517, (Utah) held that a leasehold was sufficient for a
mechanic's lien.
There are also other cases where a person who does
not hold legal title to land is nevertheless an owner of
an interest in land sufficient for mechanics' liens. One
such case is Garland vs. Bear Lake & River Waterworks
& Irrigation Co. 34 Pac. 368 (Utah) where the "owner"
at the time the contractor did the work in making a
canal actually did not own the land where the canal was
being constructed but instead it was government land
and never would go into private ownership until the improvement was constructed. Also the case of CaryLombard Lumber Co. vs. Sheets, 37 Pac. 572 (Utah)
held that possession under a contract of purchase made
one an "owner" under the mechanics' lien laws. Also
36 Am. Jur., page 34, in speaking of mechanics' liens
provides as follows:
"Thus it may attach not only to an estate in fee simple, but also to an estate less than a fee such as a life
estate, an estate for years, an estate in remainder,
and the interest of a person in possession".
The footnote to the above 36 Am. Jur. citation provides as follows:
"A person in possession is presumed to have an interest chargeable with a lien until the contrary is
made to appear by pleading or proof".
It is admitted that the defendant did not even hold

a formal lease on the land upon which the dry kiln was
built. However, under the facts of this case, the defendant had something better than a formal lease - a per·
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m1ss10n to use the land indefinitely, at no rent or payment of any taxes and with the owners of the land being
the officers and directors of the defendant corporation.
In rural areas of Utah amongst farmers, livestockmen and businessmen such as those involved here the
corporate fiction or entity is neither appreciated or' understood as it is amongst lawyers. Very often the same
men are officers of several corporations, connected together in property holdings and operation and also some
of the officers might own personally property used by
the corporation. The business of each is not kept separate and it is often difficult to determine where private business and property ownership begins and ends
with reference to corporation business.
It is clear from the facts that the land in question
was actually owned by J. E. Croft and Sons, a partnership and Croft-Pearson Industries, another partnership.
J. E. Croft and Sons, a partnership, consisted of Leo
Croft, John Croft, Cy Croft, Alfred Croft and Edward
Croft. Croft-Pearson Industries, a partnership, consisted of Marden Pearson, Dwain Pearson, Cy Croft, Leo
Croft, John Croft and Edward Croft. The directors and
officers of Utah Dry Kiln Co., Inc., the defendant comany were Marden Pearson, Dwain Pearson, Cy Croft,
Leo Croft, John Croft and Edward Croft, (Transc. 115,
117, 137). Therefore four of the five partners in J. E.
Croft and Sons were also four of the six partners in
Croft-Pearson Industries. These same four partners in
J. E. Croft and Sons were four of the six directors of
the defendant corporation. Five of the six partners
of Croft-Pearson Industries were five of the six directors of the defendant corporation. All of the officers
and directors of the defendant corporation were partners in the two partnerships. Likewise these directors
own most if not all of the corporate stock in the defendant corporation. Under these circumstances the Respondent still claims that all it had was a mere license
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which often is not an interest in land but the relationship between the directors and the legal owners made
this much more that a mere license - it made it the
owner of an interest in land. In fact the corporation is
the alter ego of the owners of the land.
The testimony shows that the defendant corporation and Croft-Pearson Industries, then a partnership
but now a corporation, operate together a considerable
lumber business. They operate together on the same
yards and use the same office building at Panguitch,
Utah. The testimony further shows that the officers
and directors of the defendant corporation and also the
partners in the two partnerships never considered it
necessary to execute a deed or a formal lease, (Transc.
116, 117). All parties concerned, whether they be officers
of the defendant corporation or partners in one of
the partnerships, were generally one and the same
and it never occurred to the officers in the defendant corporation to go to the trouble or formality of a lease or deed from the owners, who were
actually themselves, yet they built a dry kiln costing
approximately $34,000.00. There has been no thought
of cancellation or termination of the arrangements be·
cause the ones who would have to cancel are the officers
and directors of the defendant corporation. Under the tes·
timony this arrangement appears to be mutually satisf actory-the Croft-Pearson Industries, as a lumber company
had an outlet for its finish lumber right on the prem·
ises and the defendant corporation's dry kiln is located
right next to the sawmills where it has a ready supply
of lumber and even saw-dust for fuel. By permitting
the corpora ti on to remain in possession of the proper·
ty, the owners are only permitting themselves to use
their own property. In fact the owners of the land rec·
ognize the defendant corporation as the owner of the
building, although it may have no legal title in the
strict sense of the work. It is submitted that the d~
fendant corporation, by reason of the permissive use is
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an owner of an interest in land within the meaning of
the statute, particularly so when the directors of the
defendant corporation own personally the land. It would
appear that this is a much better arrangement than a
mere lease.
Furthermore, should the defendant corporation be
able to profit by this loose arrangement by being immune from many types of legal liability? Obviously no
person supplying labor or materials to the building, or
for repairs or improvements to it could ever file a mechanics' lien as the corporation could hide behind the
fact that it had no legal title to land or any interest
which a lien could reach. No judgment would ever be a
lien. It would seem that this could very well be a situation where the corporate veil or entity could be pierced
and ignored. In this connection, the language of an Oregon case is very pertinent. In the case of Mciver vs.
Norman, 213 Pac.2d. 144, the court uses the following
language:
"Mclver was the corporation and the corporation
was Mciver. Not only does Norman claim this by
laying the corporation's alleged derelictions at the
door of Mclver, Mclver does likewise by taking to
himself credit for the corporation's good deeds."
"While for all ordinary purposes, a corporation is
regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from
its stockholders, yet, as Judge Sanborn said in United
States vs. Milwaukee Refrigeration Co. 142 Fed. 247,
'When the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an
association of persons'."
Also in the case of Abbott vs. Bob's U-Drive, 352 Pac.2d.
598 (Ore.) the Court said:
"It is well established that where corporate affairs are
confused with those of stockholders, a subsidiary or
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an affiliate corporation, the corporate veil may be lift.
e? to protect persons whose rights have been jeopar·
d1zed by the corporate device."
Can the defendant corporation, by a loose arrange.
ment between its directors and officers and the own.
ers of the property, who are for all practical purposes
the same, known only to themselves, deprive a material·
man from enforcing his rights? Can they insulate themselves from liability imposed by the statutes in question? The Bank of Commerce case, supra, goes into this
very point and held that an owner of property and its
tenant cannot by arrangement between them and known
only to themselves, deprive a materialman from enforcing his rights.
This case should not be confused with a lien fore·
closure action or any other like action against real
property. This is an action personally against Utah Dry
Kiln Company. The plaintiff is not proceeding against
land as it would in a mortgage foreclosure, mechanics'
lien foreclosure or in an attachment suit against land.
In these actions the plaintiff actually proceeds against
the land itself and if the defendant does not own the
land, then the plaintiff often has no remedy. But this
is only a personal action against the defendant com·
pany and is seeking only a general judgment, not a lien
judgment and any judgment obtained would not have
to describe real property or specifically provide for the
sale of specific real property to satisfy any judgment.
This would be a general judgment the same as any
other general judgment True it would become a lien
on all real property but if the defendant owned no real
property, there would be nothing for the judgment lien
to attach to. But that should not stop the court from
rendering a general judgment against the defendant.
Any judgment rendered would only be a judgment
against the defendant and it would not affect the land
of J. E. Crofts and Sons or Croft-Pearson Industries and
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no one but the defendant would be obligated to pay the
judgment.
We should not lose sight of the reason for the statutes herein relied upon which is as pointed out in the
opinion in the first appeal - it would be wrong to permit an owner of property to have the benefits of an improvement without paying for it. Certainly no one
could claim that the defendant here is not benefitting
from the materials supplied by the plaintiff if the materials do not have to be paid for. Under the arrangement
for the use of the property it will benefit from the material supplied just as much as if it owned the land. The
corporation's only concern would be that possibly at
some remote time, the owners of the land would "kick"
the defendant company off the premises but as herein
shown, it would be a situation of the owners kicking
themselves off the land.
Since the evil these statutes are intended to prevent is having your property benefitted by the labors
or materials of some one else without paying for it, that
should be the main concern of the Court; not a technical or strict application of the statutes which would defeat justice and equity and do violence to common sense.
It would also appear that this arrangement between the legal owners of the land and the defendant
corporation could well be determined to be a joint venture between a corporation and a partnership, consisting of the same individuals, in the operation of a sawmill and finished lumber business, with the assets of
one, committed to the joint venture, being the assets
of the other.
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it appears that without question the
equipment supplied by the plaintiff was used in and in·
corporated into the dry kiln of the defendant and most
certainly was an improvement to land. That by the meth·
od of operation between the defendant and the legal
holders of legal title to the land, the defendant corporation has a sufficient interest in land to come within the
meaning of the statute and sufficient to prevent the
wrong which the statute was intended to prevent. That
if there is any question about whether the defendant
has a sufficient interest in land, the closeness between
the corporate officers and the legal owners, who are for
all practical purposes the same, make the arrangement,
whatever it may be called, an interest in land sufficient
that the defendant corporation should not be allowed to
dodge its financial responsibilities by its own "sloppy"
business arrangements.
Respectfully submitted,
ORVILLE ISOM
Attorney for Appellant

